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THE MOBILIZATION PROGRAM AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
By MANLY FLEISCHMANN '
It seems probable that the future historian will consider the Soviet-
directed invasion of South Korea a turning point in history comparable
to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In any event, it is clear that
American intervention in Korea ended a brief and inglorious period
in American history, which in less than five years had destroyed our
military and diplomatic position and altered the whole balance of
power existing at the conclusion of World War II.
Aroused from a sleep which in retrospect seems more of a night-
mare, this nation set about repairing its international fences, and re-
capturing the position of leadership in the free world to which it is
clearly entitled by reason of its inherent economic strength and mili-
tary potentialities.
The chain reaction which the Soviet planners inadvertently set
off in June 1950 is still moving forward; it is too early to say whether
we will achieve a predominance of military and industrial strength in
time to end the threat of all-out war. In my own judgment, the years
1951 and 1952 are the most critically dangerous for the nation in this
respect. It is certain, however, that if diplomacy should fail and war
should come in 1952 or thereafter, we will be far better prepared to
wage it to a successful conclusion than at any time since we began the
process of military self-destruction in 1946.
The American public, the Congress and the Executive Department
of the Government all reacted promptly to the threat to our security
made manifest by the Korean invasion. Supplemental appropriations,
t Administrator, Defense Production Administration. Formerly Administrator,
National Production Authority; Assistant General Counsel, War Production Board
and predecessor agencies; General Counsel, Foreign Liquidation Commission, De-
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which soon reached staggering peacetime levels, were authorized for
the military establishment. The Defense Production Act of 1950
became law on September 8, 1950.1 This statute was modeled on the
Second War Powers Act 2 which had evolved during World War II.
It granted to the President complete power to regulate every phase of
industry and commerce, through the authority to allocate materials and
facilities. No such authority has ever previously been granted by
Congress except in time of all-out war. Emergency agencies, based
largely on World War II models, were speedily organized. These
included first the National Production Authority in the Department
of Commerce, then the Office of Defense Mobilization, and shortly after
January 1, 1951, the Defense Production Administration. These
agencies, in turn, wasted no time in getting to the tasks at hand.
I have described elsewhere 3 the general policies and procedures
which were adopted by the emergency production agencies to carry
out the responsibilities vested in them. I propose to describe here
some of the more specific policies and procedures which have been de-
veloped in the year and one-half since Korea, designed primarily to
supplement and strengthen the basic mobilization policies by assuring
a continuous and vigilant regard for the public interest in the ad-
ministration of these vast powers during an emergency period of
uncertain duration.
In order to appreciate the breadth and variety of these special
problems, it will be helpful to restate briefly the mobilization plan which
has been adopted, and the procedures used to put it into effect. The
basic plan, which has not been changed since the fall of 1951, is as
follows:
First and foremost, the plan is based upon the premise that the
nation is in peril and that all doubts must be resolved in favor of restor-
ing our military and industrial strength at the earliest possible moment.
Such mistakes as have been made, and of course there have been some,
are generally the result of our attempt to do too much in too short a
space of time, with inadequate planning in the early stages.
Second, the plan calls for the provision of munitions in quantities
sufficient to supply comparatively small forces with the most modem
implements of war. Instead of unlimited production of armament,
with the attendant problem of rapid obsolescence, the plan requires
1. Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 STAT. 798, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2061 et seq.
(1951). Hereafter section numbers refer to the original act.
2. Second War Powers Act, 56 STAT. 176 (1942), 50 U.S.C. Ap,. § 631 et seq.
(1951).
3. Fleischmann, Policies and Procedures for Limited Mobilization, 278 ANNALS
110 (1951).
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the construction of facilities in being, so that military production can
be speedily and drastically increased in the event of all-out war.
Third, the plan calls for a tremendous industrial expansion. This
includes the specialized items such as machine tools and industrial
equipment which are needed to produce munitions, and also expansion
of our basic capacity to produce materials such as steel, aluminum,
synthetic rubber and chemicals. It is believed that this tremendous ex-
pansion of capacity will insure an industrial supremacy for the free
world sufficient to make the prospect of an aggressive war very un-
attractive to our potential enemies. At the same time, as the very
substantial new supply of material becomes available the shortages from
which the nation now suffers will gradually disappear and normal
civilian production can be resumed.
Finally, it is an integral part of the plan that the above objectives
are to be accomplished if possible without an entire suspension of
civilian production such as was required during World War II. This
objective is by no means easy of accomplishment, since the military and
industrial expansion programs make tremendous inroads on our
limited supply of scarce materials, and tax our facilities to produce
certain types of equipment and components to the utmost. Never-
theless, as we approach the half-way mark in the three-year mobiliza-
tion drive, it still appears that the basic plan was a sound one and that
we will be able to adhere to it without substantial alteration.
There is a corollary to this last point. It is certain that civilian
production can only be maintained at a substantially reduced rate,
since in every case military production has been and will be given
the preference. The problem then arises of seeing to it that an equitable
distribution of the inadequate supply of materials is made among com-
peting and less essential producers. This is a problem which was
eliminated to a substantial degree during World War II by banning
non-essential production. We have felt that such a course would not
be sound in the present emergency, which may continue for many years.
Despite recently publicized opinions to the contrary, I think it clear
that such action would not substantially increase production of the
most essential military items, such as planes, tanks and missiles, where
the limiting factors are machine tool bottlenecks, lack of adequate sup-
plies of alloying elements, and design problems. In any event, the
policy of maintaining some level of civilian production has been thought
sound in order to avoid the tremendous dislocations, including wide-
spread unemployment and loss of national revenue, which would flow
from a complete cessation of such production; these dislocations could
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only be adequately dealt with by an accompanying and unnecessary
expansion of current production of "easy to get" military items such
as jeeps and guns. Such an expansion would be justified only by
the immediate threat of involvement in an all-out war.
On the procedural side, we have re-established a basic regulatory
system which was used in World War II, the Controlled Materials
Plan. This plan controls the entire economy in the interest of the
mobilization effort by distributing the nation's supply of the three key
metals, steel, copper and aluminum. The determining factor in our
decision to institute this most drastic form of government regulation
was again the conviction that the nation must be made strong enough
to resist aggression at the earliest possible moment. There is no
other known method of channeling scarce materials to the most es-
sential military and industrial programs, although many others were
tried and discarded in World War II. As a result of this conviction,
the Controlled Materials Plan was put in operation less than a year
after the Defense Production Act was passed, much earlier than most
students of the subject believed feasible.4 CMP continues to provide
headaches for its administrators and for those who operate under it,
as it did all during World War II, but we do know that the most im-
portant programs are now receiving material in accordance with basic
policy determinations as to relative needs and urgencies. Here, at
least, the Government cannot justly be accused of having done too
little too late.
It will be observed that while the basic policy of limited mobiliza-
tion differs radically from the mobilization program required for
World War II, the procedures which have been adopted are in general
almost identical to those developed between 1941 and 1945. I now
wish to call attention to some of the special problems presented by a
limited mobilization effort of uncertain duration, and describe the solu-
tions which we are endeavoring to provide, particularly in the field of
the public interest in a fair and equitable administration of the emer-
gency powers.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BASIC MOBILIZATION PROGRAM
In a period of tremendous industrial effort, whether it be a time
of war or partial robilization, demands for scarce materials and for
4. Drafting of the World War II model of CMP commenced in June 1942.
The first transitional quarter of operations was the second calendar quarter of 1943.
Construction was brought in during the third quarter but the plan was not fully opera-
five until the last quarter of that year.
Drafting of the present CMP commenced in January 1951. The first transitional
quarter of operations began in July, with construction and the consumer durable goods
industries being brought under the plan in the fourth quarter of 1951.
1952] MOBILIZATION PROGRAM AND PUBLIC INTEREST 487
industrial equipment, components and products inevitably greatly ex-
ceed the supply. For example, in the fourth quarter of 1951 the
demand for structural steel, largely attributable to the military and in-
dustrial expansion programs, equalled approximately 220% of the
available supply.
Under these circumstances, if the most important mobilization
programs are to be completed on schedule, the Government must act
as umpire in the fiercely competitive struggle for material, and must see
to it that first things come first. Of equal importance, the Government
must provide a balanced program, since the provision of the irreducible
minimum of essential civilian goods, such as fire engines and water
mains, is of comparable importance to the attainment of military pro-
duction goals.
The accomplishment of a balanced program of this kind is es-
sential in a mobilization effort, but most difficult of realization. After
long experiments, there emerged in the War Production Board the
device of a so-called Requirements Committee where "claimant
agencies" for various military and other mobilization programs could
present their demands for scarce material. The Requirements Com-
mittee improved its operations continuously, and late in World War
II it had become a highly efficient organization for determining basic
policy of the mobilization program.
The same device was adopted in the present effort, and an inter-
agency Requirements Committee was set up early in 1951. Drawing
on World War II experience, operating procedures were immediately
available. Detailed requirements of various programs in terms of
steel, copper and aluminum were presented as early as April of that
year, permitting the activation of the Controlled Materials Plan on
July 1.
An important organizational difference between the present
mobilization effort and the World War II operation may here be
noted. In the present operation, far greater responsibilities have been
placed in existing government agencies, including the Commerce De-
partment, where the National Production Authority has its home, and
the Interior Department, which is responsible for the petroleum, solid
fuels, electric power and natural gas programs, among others. Co-
ordination among these programs is obtained through the Requirements
Committee and through policy control exercised by the Office of De-
fense Mobilization and the Defense Production Administration. While
an argument might the made as to the desirability of continuing this
administrative arrangement in the event of all-out war, it is certain
that it has resulted in substantial savings in money and personnel.
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For example, the combined staffs of the DPA and NPA which between
them exercise the majority of the powers which were lodged in the
War Production Board, number less than 6,000 people, as compared
with over 20,000 in WPB.
Very real improvements in integrating the mobilization program
have been brought about by the development of new techniques in
this field. We can predict with some certainty the supply-requirements
picture in the three basic metals for the whole year 1952, since re-
quirements have been analyzed months in advance. While material
allocations are still made on a quarterly basis, as was done during
World War II, the increasing accuracy of the data available to the
mobilization agencies permits us to make reasonable forecasts of ma-
terial distribution for several quarters in advance. In the same way,
it is possible to predict that increased supply will catch up with com-
bined requirements in many materials by the end of the year 1953 or
earlier. If we escape all-out war, the period of scarcity and restrictive
control will not be a long one.
UNIFORM STANDARDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
Like its predecessor, the Second War Powers Act, the Defense
Production Act provides only the most general standards for ad-
ministrative action. The most important portion of the statute reads
as follows:
"Sec. 101. The President is hereby authorized (1) to re-
quire that performance under contracts or orders (other than con-
tracts of employment) which he deems necessary or appropriate
to promote the national defense shall take priority over perform-
ance under any other contract or order, and, for the purpose of
assuring such priority, to require acceptance and performance
of such contracts or orders in preference to other contracts or
orders by any person he finds to be capable of their performance,
and (2) to allocate materials and facilities in such manner, upon
such conditions, and to such extent as he shall deem necessary
or appropriate to promote the national defense. No restriction,
quota, or other limitation shall be placed upon the quantity of
livestock which may be slaughtered or handled by any processor."
The tremendously complicated task of evolving adequate ad-
ministrative policies and procedures to implement the general terms
of the earlier statute has been described in an article by Mr. John Lord
O'Brian and myself.5 The need for such administrative control is
5. O'Brian and Fleischmann, The War Production Board Administrative Policies
and Procedures, 13 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 1 (1944).
1952] MOBILIZATION PROGRAM AND PUBLIC INTEREST 489
even more apparent in the present limited mobilization effort because
of the existence of a so-called dual economy, i.e., the maintenance of
civilian production simultaneously with military production. The
simple test of essentiality from a war standpoint, which was always
primary in 1941-1945, is wholly inadequate under existing circum-
stances.
Guided by World War II experience, a complete system of internal
administrative control was set up in NPA at once. The early difficulty
encountered by the War Production Board in the broadside issuance
of unauthorized orders and directions was completely obviated. Gen-
eral orders and regulations were promulgated and published; written
delegations of authority to administer the orders were provided in every
case; and written criteria for administration were also developed and
continuously improved as new information on the impact of the Gov-
ernment's regulatory activities was received. All of the official actions
of the National Production Authority are issued through a single office
which provides a control point for the verification of official action. In
this way, we have tried to maintain a uniformity of policy and a con-
sistency of treatment of persons in similar circumstances which cannot
be achieved by any other procedure.
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIAL FOR CIVILIAN PRODUCTION
In no other area of government controls is an impartial and
efficient distribution of materials more necessary than ifi the field of
civilian production. By the same token, no field presents more diffi-
culties in bringing about such a result.
Section 701 (c) of the Defense Production Act, as amended, has
this to say on the subject:
"Whenever the President invokes the powers given him in
this Act to allocate, or approve agreements allocating, any ma-
terial, to an extent which the President finds will result in a
significant dislocation of the normal distribution in the civilian
market, he shall do so in such a manner as to make available,
so far as practicable, for business and various segments thereof in
the normal channel of distribution of such material, a fair share
of the available civilian supply based, so far as practicable, on the
share received by such business under normal conditions during a
representative period preceding June 24, 1950 and having due
regard to the current competitive position of established business:
Provided, That the limitations and restrictions imposed on the
production of specific items shall not exclude new concerns from
a fair and reasonable share of total authorized production." 6
6. The italicized portion represents changes made by the Wolcott Amendment
in the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951, Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong., Ist
Sess. § 701(c) (July 31, 1951).
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I think it clear that the statute was not intended to prevent ad-
ministrative decisions giving different amounts of material to various
civilian items based on comparative essentiality, since such an interpre-
tation would create an impossible administrative standard. Metal for
plumbing supplies and metal for ash trays and window shades are ob-
viously not of equal importance in a mobilization economy; we can
do without the latter, but must have the former if we wish to ac-
complish our industrial expansion and defense housing programs.
On the other hand, it would require the wisdom of Solomon to
arrive at refined judgments of comparative degrees of essentiality with
respect to the many thousands of civilian items containing metal; such
wisdom is a commodity as scarce in Washington as elsewhere. Simpler
standards had to be evolved for the distribution of metals among com-
peting civilian demands if the whole allocation system was to escape
public disrepute. I will describe two somewhat different policies which
have been under consideration in dealing with this problem. The first
policy, which is not currently in operation, recognizes the legal au-
thority to differentiate between civilian products on the grounds of vary-
ing essentiality in the civilian economy, but proceeds on the assumption
that such differentiations are not required at the present time. It takes
into account the fact that inventories of most civilian goods are cur-
rently high and that no widespread shortages need be expected during
coming months as a result of even very substantial cutbacks. Ac-
cordingly, under this policy the entire supply of the three basic metals
would be divided up among all competing civilian users pro rata, on the
basis of their historical pre-Korea use, without regard to comparative
essentiality. Under this policy, the manufacturer of refrigerators would
receive the same percentage allotment, based on his pre-Korea use, as
the jewelry manufacturer. This policy has the obvious advantage of
spreading the dislocations caused by the mobilization effort as equitably
as possible over all classes of civilian producers.
The second policy, which has been adopted for the first quarter of
1952, proceeds upon the assumption that the increasing tempo of the
military production program will soon result in civilian shortages
which can only be met by concentrating on more essential items for
civilian use at the expense of the less essential or clearly frivolous
products. Under this policy, all civilian goods are divided into one
of two categories which for convenience I will refer to as essential
and non-essential. In the "non-essential" class are placed two groups
of items: (1) those which are non-essential because they perform no
indispensable function in the economy or in American life--or at least
the need for them is clearly deferrable (In this group are such items as
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jewelry, metal ash trays, venetian blinds and the like.); (2) those
which may be essential from a functional standpoint but which could
be made of a less scarce material. (Examples are aluminum windows
or siding, since steel could be substituted in either case with reason-
able facility.)
All civilian or consumer type items which do not fall in this "non-
essential" class are considered as falling within the "essential" class,
and different rules are applied in determining metal allocations for
the two classes.
Under either policy, we have tried to avoid the so-called "death
sentence" even for the manufacturer of the least essential item. During
World War II, the use of copper in making ash trays or aluminum in
windows was forbidden, and many business failures resulted from this
policy which is certainly indispensable in all-out mobilization. Today,
circumstances are far different; the military demand for material does
not pre-empt the entire supply; the period of semi-mobilization is of
indefinite duration, but greatly increased production of steel and alu-
minum is just around the corner; most important of all, the limited
military program can use only a portion of the metal fabricating facili-
ties which would be made idle by the "death sentence."
Under these circumstances, we have thus far made small amounts
of metal available even to the jewelry manufacturers and I hope that
it will be possible to continue this policy. I think it probable that we
can do so with aluminum and steel, but I am not so optimistic about
our supplies of 'copper and nickel.
In any event, under the second policy the treatment of the two
classes of civilian products-"essential" and "non-essential"-is quite
different. We have been able so far to allot metals to the first class
in amounts sufficient to maintain adequate production from the stand-
point of the needs of our civilian economy. Allocation is based upon
metal consumption during a base period, as required by statute. Dur-
ing the first quarter of 1952 we are allocating to the essential group
approximately 50% of the steel and 357 of the copper and aluminum
consumed in an average quarter of the banner production year 1950.
In view of the nation's bulging warehouses and stores, it seems ap-
parent that this production level means no austerity for the civilian
in the predictable future.
The non-essential producer is less fortunate. He, too, receives
somcthing like 50% of his 1950 steel use, but only 20% of his aluminum
use and 10% of copper. Additional steel may be allowed him if he can
show that he can substitute it for aluminum or copper. Many will not
survive this Spartan diet but the ingenuity of American industry is
!
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boundless, and the policy at least provides a chance for survival to every
business concern. The nation's metal stringency permits no more than
that.
Within the two classes, the most strenuous efforts are made to
insure equal treatment. Here again the task presents almost unimagin-
able difficulties because of the tremendous complexities of the American
industrial machine. One man fabricates an entire article, while his
competitor merely assembles purchased parts. One concern had a strike
in the base period; as a result its competitors had a record year at its
expense. These are but two of an infinite number of variables which
must be dealt with if the goal of equal treatment for individuals in the
same circumstances is even to be approximated. These and many
others have been made the subject of detailed written "processing in-
structions" for the issuance of CMP allocations. The instructions are
available for public inspection and are constantly being improved.
At the present time, the agencies with which I am associated are
making a study of the effect of the adoption of the second policy which
I have described, and the desirability of continuing it in preference to
the first policy outlined above. Either policy has its obvious draw-
backs. The first policy is patently preferable from the standpoint
of what might be called "natural justice," since it treats all classes
of civilian producers on the same basis. On the other hand, it seems
very probably that civilian shortages will result from the mobilization
effort at some time in the not too distant future. When that happens,
it will certainly be necessary to provide some kind of an essentiality
test as the basis for allocation.
In any event, at the time this is written the issue has not been
finally determined; in this field of government regulation one must in
fact be a "re-examinationist" continuously of both policies and pro-
cedures. I believe that either policy satisfies the statutory standard
and can be administered fairly and impartially. The ultimate decision
will have to be made on the basis of a judgment as to which policy
will best serve the public interest in the months ahead.
A word should be said about a small but important exception that
has been made to the general rules just discussed. From the outset
of the program, special arrangements have been made for the smallest
business concerns. This is a recognition, sanctioned by statuteJ of
the special difficulties encountered by these concerns in a period of
7. See, e.g., Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, §2(b) 62 STAT. 21
(1948), 41 U.S.C. § 151(b) (Supp. 1951) ; Selective Service Act of 1948, § 18(a), 62
STAT. 604, 626 (1948), 50 U.S.C. § 468(a) (Supp. 1951); Defense Production Act,
supra note 1, § 701 ; Defense Production Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. (July 31, 1951).
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scarcity. These difficulties are of two kinds: in the 'first place the
small concern finds it difficult to compete with his larger competitor
for the inadequate supply of material, in view of the latter's superior
purchasing power and better supplier relationships; second, the smaller
concern usually has a higher break-even point and fewer resources with
which to survive a prolonged period of reduced activity. Accordingly,
the CMP regulations, and many individual orders, permit self-cer-
tification on a preferred basis for the requirements of the smallest users
of scarce materials.8 The total use of materials by small concerns which
receive this authority is very small compared with the advantage to the
nation in maintaining small industrial units throughout an emergency
period.
APPEALS BOARD
Following the experience of the War Production Board, an appeals
board was set up in the NPA at an early date, and has functioned
continuously and on an increasing scale ever since. The establishment
of the Board is a recognition of the fact that no system of allocation
and control works perfectly, and that individual cases of hardship and
inequity will result from the mechanical application of any general rules.
The Appeals Board is appointed by, and responsible only to, the Ad-
ministrator. It consists of full-time government employees exclusively.
The present membership of the Board includes individuals with out-
standing records in the fields of law, industry and labor relations.
The Board does not undertake to review or reverse agency policy,
but it does have authority to mitigate the impact of that policy upon
a particular firm where an unusual hardship is proven, beyond that
suffered by the industry generally. Just as in the last war, the Appeals
Board has proven an invaluable "escape valve" for the whole regulatory
program, and its reputation for impartial and expeditious handling
of appeals is high both within and without the Government. No formal
procedure of any kind is provided. Cases may be presented by counsel
or by the individual appellant. Oral hearings are granted when ap-
propriate, but the appellant may always confine himself to a written
submission if that is more convenient. Public notice has been given
regarding the grounds for appeal and methods of filing.9 Approxi-
mately 330 cases have been submitted to the Appeals Board since its
inception; 44 have been granted in whole or in part, and 115 denied;
88 are pending and the balance have been dismissed or withdrawn.
8. For a summary of NPA orders and regulations as they affect small business,
see Progress Report No. 11, Joint Committee on Defense Production, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess., pp. 50-57 (1951).
9. 16 FaD. REG. 10386 (1951).
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STAFFING THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
During World War II, there was much congressional criticism-
much of it unjustified-of the activities of so-called "Dollar-a-Year
Men." As a result of this criticism, there was substantial congressional
opinion in favor of prohibiting the employment of businessmen with-
out compensation under the Defense Production Act. Fortunately
for the success of the mobilization effort, World War II precedent
was followed, and section 710(b) permits the employment of "persons
of outstanding experience and ability without compensation." The
present-day equivalent of the war-time Dollar-a-Year Man is called
a "WOC" (Without Compensation) .
If war-time administrators found it difficult to convince capable
businessmen that they should accept inadequate government salaries
in time of war, it will be understood that such difficulties have been
multiplied many times in the present semi-mobilization period. The
number of outstanding business leaders who have been willing to sever
their connections with their own concerns and go on the government
payroll at a personal sacrifice may be counted on the fingers of two
hands. At the same time, it has been quite impossible to recruit any
adequate number of government career employees with the industrial
experience and specialized abilities to organize and administer the
extensive and complicated organizations and procedures without which
the operation cannot be conducted. As a result, much reliance has
necessarily been placed on WOC employees made available by private
concerns, usually on a temporary basis. Obviously, this is not an ideal
situation, but no one has yet suggested a practicable alternative.
In order to obviate the criticism of WOC employees, whether
justified or not, definite limitations on their authority have been set
up by Executive Order " and by internal agency regulation. 2 For
example, no WOC employee is permitted to pass upon individual ap-
plications for relief or assistance made by any business organization
in which he has a pecuniary interest. More importantly, the most far-
reaching policy decisions of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the De-
fense Production Administration and the National Production Au-
thority (such as the decision to adopt the controlled materials plan)
10. A full account of Dollar-A-Year men and the problem of the conflict of in-
terest during World War II may be found in a study by James A. McAleer, Dollar-
A-Year and Without Compensation Personnel Policies of the War Production Board
and Predecessor Agencies, August 1939 to November 1945. See Special Study No.
27 in the series, Historical Report on War Administration, published by the Civilian
Production Administration (1947).
11. 15 FED. REG. 8013 (1950) ; 16 id. 419 (1951).
12. See NPA, General Administrative Instructions 204-6 and 204-26 (May 1,
1951).
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have been made by top officials who have severed their private connec-
tions and have become full-time government employees for the duration.
Finally, the events to date overwhelmingly demonstrate both the
invaluable service performed by WOC employees and the complete
integrity and patriotic motivation of their work. I know of no single
case in which a WOC employee has preferred his own concern or
discriminated against a competitor; on the contrary, the typical WOC
employee is quick to disqualify himself in the event of a real or imagined
conflict of interest, and will invariably insist that any such decision
be made by a person whose decision would not involve such a conflict.
As a matter of fact, there are many cases where a WOC employee has
leaned over backwards to avoid giving even the impression of favorit-
ism to his own concern. Under these circumstances, it is clear that
the public interest is amply protected, and the mobilization effort is
greatly strengthened by the wise decision of American industry to co-
operate with the government actively in this program.
PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY
During World War II, the requirements of war-time security were
frequently abused and used as excuse for concealing war agency mis-
takes. A directly contrary policy has been followed in the present
operation. We have deliberately adopted a "goldfish bowl" policy,
and permit and encourage the widest possible publicity for all official
actions. This policy is adhered to, even when it appears that serious
mistakes have been made.
It is clear that the public interest is best served by such a rule.
As a result of the very widespread publicity that has been given to
NPA actions, much intelligent criticism and many recommendations
for improvement have been made and adopted. Public confidence in
the integrity of our operations has, I think, remained high even in
a period of general distrust of government activity. The policy has
been widely commended by the press and by industry, and I am certain
that it has paid many dividends in public understanding and confidence.
INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEES
The defense agencies in the present program have capitalized on
the experience of the War Production Board in the utilization of in-
dustry advisory committees. This is both a matter of determined
policy by the agencies, and statutory mandate. 3 More than 500 in-
dustry advisory committees have been set up by the NPA. Great
13. Defense Production Act, supra note 1, §§ 701(b) (ii) and 709.
496 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100
care is taken in the selection of committee members. A separate office
has been set up under an Assistant Administrator to see to it that
the committees are representative, as required by the statute and by
internal administrative regulations. I believe that this has been done
successfully, as the complaints concerning this make-up of the com-
mittees have decreased to almost nothing. A representative cross-
section of industry views and advice is assured by offering member-
ship to persons associated with: large, small, and medium-sized con-
cerns; members and nonmembers of trade associations; and concerns
located in different geographical areas and active in different segments
of the particular industry involved.
We have worked out with the Department of Justice detailed pro-
cedures governing the conduct of industry advisory committee meet-
ings. Such meetings are always held at the call of the NPA and under
the chairmanship of full-time government officials who serve as the
government presiding officers; agenda are initiated and formulated
by the NPA; full minutes are kept; and full publicity is given to the
deliberations.
Complaints are sometimes made that industry committees are
called to consider action which has really been determined in advance
of the meeting. I do not believe this criticism to be generally justified,
although I think it probable that there have been. such cases. The
criticism most usually reflects the fact that contemplated action dis-
cussed by the government presiding officer, frequently in the nature
of a cutback of the industry's allocations, is objected to by most of
the committee. Much time and effort is saved by having a preliminary
draft of a proposed regulation available for discussion when the com-
mittee meets. After examining many complaints along these lines,
I have generally found that the criticism really is directed against the
failure of the Government to accept the committee's recommendations,
rather than a failure to obtain such recommendations.
In any event, the industry advisory committees have been of the
greatest possible benefit to the Government in organizing the mobili-
zation program. Scores of ill-considered proposals have been per-
manently shelved by reason of valid criticism from the committees.
Arbitrary regulations have been improved and in many cases the
necessity for regulation has been entirely obviated as a result of the
free and frank discussion which is a feature of these meetings. In
no sense have the industry advisory committees acted as a rubber stamp
for government policy; on the contrary, the general tenor of many
meetings is often critical of the Government, as one would expect in
a period of restrictive regulation.
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Every effort is made to see to it that violations of the antitrust
laws are not sponsored or permitted by the Government through its
use of industry advisory committees. Trained government men are in
attendance at all meetings to remind the committee members that their
function is advisory only; that they do not make decisions, carry out
decisions, or coerce any member of the industry; and that they may
not with immunity agree among themselves as to a proposed course of
action, however meritorious it may appear. All decisions are made
and carried out solely by tfie responsible officials of the Government and
are generally incorporated in appropriate written regulations and orders.
OTHER ANTITRUST PROBLEMS
The mobilization program inevitably encourages the development
of certain monopolistic trends, sometimes with the encouragement
of the Government itself. Continuous vigilance is needed in this area
of mobilization management. The special treatment given to small
business concerns, the rules restricting the activities of employees with-
out compensation, and the procedural regulations governing the ac-
tivities of industry advisory committees "4 are all measures designed to
reduce or eliminate monopolistic trends which might otherwise get
out of hand.
During World War II, Congress authorized immunity from anti-
trust prosecution for defense producers participating in voluntary agree-
ments approved by the Government.' 5 More than 600 of these ar-
rangements were approved, and contributed substantially to the war
production effort. Nevertheless, it is perfectly clear that the arrange-
ments sanctioned activities which in ordinary times would violate
the antitrust laws and would give a preferred competitive status to the
participants. Examples of such advantages are authorizations to ex-
change technical information, concentration of orders for special items
in one particular concern, and other arrangements.
We have felt that there was less justification for such arrange-
ments in the present limited mobilization effort, despite the fact that
broad statutory authority has been set up in Section 708 6f the Defense
Production Act of 1950, as amended, for the approval of "voluntary
agreements and programs to further objectives of this Act." We have
limited approvals, in most instances, to cases where the item to be
manufactured was used primarily by the military. We have not per-
14. National Production Authority General Program Order No. 6, issued De-
cember 18, 1950.
15. 56 STAT. 357 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1112 (1946), repealed, 61 STAT. 449, 50
U.S.C. App. § 1112 (Supp. 1951).
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mitted such arrangements with respect to the production of consumer
items, such as shoes, kitchenware, etc. The Act provides that the
authority to approve such arrangements shall be delegated only to a
single official appointed by the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate; that consultation with the Attorney General and the
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission with respect to these ar-
rangements shall be had and that approval by the Attorney General
of requests to participate in them shall be obtained. Only 36 arrange-
ments have been authorized by me as Administrator of the Defense
Production Administration since the passage of the Act, and it seems
unlikely that any large number of approvals will be granted in the
future.
SUMMARY
The Office of Defense Mobilization, the Defense Production Ad-
ministration and the various executive agencies exercising allocation
authority under the Defense Production Act have been entrusted with
powers never before vested in the executive branch of the Government
except in time of all-out war. The American pebple, through their
representatives in Congress, have approved this unique creation and
delegation of authority. It has been their reasoned conviction that
only thus can a democracy compete with a totalitarian state in time of
emergency. Since the period of emergency may continue for an in-
definite time, it is obviously of the greatest possible importance that
the drastic powers so granted be exercised with a continuing and
vigilant concern for the public interest. Due process of law in the
traditional sense clearly cannot be insisted upon. Instead, we have
relied on impartial administration according to public and published
standards. Mistakes have been made in the past and undoubtedly will
be made in the future, but honest and unremitting efforts to improve
the basic policies and the operating procedures of this vast undertak-
ing have also been made and will continue in the future. At about the
half-way point in the mobilization effort, it is my own belief that the
goal of national security will be reached pretty much on schedule and
without impairment of the American tradition of impartial justice
according to law.
